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Synonyms 
complication, intricacy 
 
Definition 
Complex systems are associated with a range of different characteristics like the 
multiplicity of their parts, the non-linearity and non-additivity of the interactions 
between their parts, the sensitivity of their behavior to initial conditions, their 
hierarchical organization, their self-organization, and the robustness and the 
emergence of their behavior. Some of these characteristics are necessary conditions 
for a system to be complex; others are just typical for many complex systems. The 
latter is due to the fact that nature exhibits a variety of different kinds of complexity.   
 
Characteristics 
In recent decades the focus of scientific research has shifted more and more to 
trying to understand and handle the complexity of nature. In biology, for instance, the 
reductionistic assumptions (reduction) that there is a neat, simple gene-protein-trait-
fitness relationship and that the behavior of a biological system can be understood 
merely by studying the parts of the system in isolation have been rejected. Instead, 
contemporary biologists try to account for the complexity of nature by recognizing the 
“wholeness” (holism) of biological systems (e.g. Chong and Ray 2002), that is, by 
paying attention to the various interactions between the parts of a system and to how 
these parts are integrated to the system as a whole. For example, rather than 
examining the isolated functions of genes biologists study the dynamics of entire 
gene regulatory networks. This focus shift towards complexity issues is not restricted 
to the biological sciences. Rather, it is a quite general trend, which is why some 
authors speak of a “complex system revolution” (Hooker 2011, 6) that has been and 
still takes place in contemporary science.  
 
1. What Is a Complex System? 
Despite the fact that complexity issues more and more gain center stage in several 
research fields there exists neither a unified science of complex systems, nor a 
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consensus about what complexity is and what makes a system complex. Rather, the 
characterizations of complexity partially vary from field to field and from author to 
author. There are two different ways of how one could react to this situation. On the 
one hand, one could argue that there is still much empirical and conceptual work left 
to do, and that sometime in the next future scientists and philosophers will have 
figured out how to specify what a complex system is. On the other hand, one could 
point out that the actual disagreement on how to characterize complexity is not due 
to our insufficient knowledge. Rather, it arises from the actual variety of ways that 
systems are complex. In other words, nature exhibits different kinds of complexity 
that cannot be captured by a single definition. 
 Depending on which claim an author subscribes to, he will favor one of two 
strategies for characterizing complexity: first, several authors try to specify what 
complexity is by proposing a list of features, each of which is necessary and all 
together are sufficient for a system to be complex (e.g. Hooker 2011; Ladyman et al. 
2012); the second strategy consists in distinguishing different kinds of complexity 
(e.g. Mitchell 2003; Kuhlmann 2011). In this section some crucial insights of pursuing 
the first strategy will be revealed, whereas Section 2 introduces some classifications 
of complexity (second strategy).  
 Before doing so it should be stressed that the two strategies are neither 
opposite nor incompatible. What distinguishes them is the emphasis they put on the 
diversity of complexity. Those who aim at a definition of complexity which identifies 
necessary and together sufficient conditions for a system to be complex (first 
strategy) focus on the similarities among different cases of complexity. On the 
contrary, those who pursue the second strategy and distinguish different kinds of 
complexity put more emphasis on the actual variety of ways that systems are 
complex. However, it is also possible to seek after a list of core features of complex 
systems and at the same time account for their diversity. For instance, one could 
abandon the requirement that these features must be necessary and allow also 
features on the list that are only typical for many (but not for all) complex systems. 
Furthermore, one could also combine the first and the second strategy by, at first, 
distinguishing different kinds of complexity, and then specifying these types of 
complexity by identifying different sets of features that are associated with these 
different kinds of complexity.  
 What are the features that are said to be necessary for complexity or that are 
at least typical for many complex systems? The following main features are widely 
associated with complex systems (which is not to say that this list is exhaustive; for 
alternative approaches see Hooker 2011 or Ladyman et al. 2012): 
 
Multiplicity of parts 
Complex systems typically consist of a large number of parts. In some cases, many 
of these parts are of the same or of similar kind (e.g. a swarm of birds is composed 
of birds of the same species). Other complex systems are made of components that 
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belong to several different kinds (e.g. organ systems like the cardiovascular system 
consist of different kinds of tissues and cells). 
 
Non-linearity and non-additivity of interactions 
The parts of a complex system causally interact (causality) with each other in order 
to bring about a particular behavior of the overall system. It is characteristic for many 
complex systems that these interactions are non-linear, more precisely, that the 
behavior of the system is described by a mathematical function that is non-linear 
(e.g. because the variable of interest is squared). Non-linear interactions frequently 
involve positive or negative feedback. 
Non-linear dynamical equations are characterized by non-additivity, which 
means that numerical combinations of solutions are in general not solutions. The 
feature of non-additivity is one reason why complex systems are said to be “more 
than the sums of their parts”. To put it another way, complex systems are not 
aggregative systems (Wimsatt 2007) because their behavior does not remain 
invariant under interchanging their parts, under changes in the number of parts, and 
under decomposing and rearranging their parts, and the interactions among their 
parts are not linear. 
 
Sensitivity to initial conditions 
The behavior of some complex systems is sensitive to initial conditions. This is due 
to the fact that the non-linearity of the interactions between the system’s parts allows 
small differences in the system state to be amplified (amplification) into large 
differences in the subsequent system trajectory. 
 
Hierarchical organization 
Complex systems typically possess a hierarchical nature (hierarchy), that is, they are 
parts of higher-level systems and they consist of parts that are themselves (lower-
level) systems which, in turn, may also be composed of subsystems, and so on. For 
instance, organisms consist of organ systems that are composed of tissues which 
consist of cells, etc. This feature is also referred to as the multi-level character of 
complex systems. Recognizing the hierarchical nature of complex systems is 
important for understanding how complexity can evolve (Simon 1962). 
 
Self-organization 
Complex systems are self-organizing systems. Self-organization means that an 
initially disordered system becomes more organized or ordered because of the 
interactions of the parts of the system. The process of self-organization is 
spontaneous, that is, it is not centrally controlled by any agent or subsystem. 
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Robustness 
The organization or order of a complex system is said to be robust (robustness), that 
is, it remains stable under a certain range of disturbances of the parts of the system. 
 
Emergence 
The behavior of complex systems is often said to be emergent (emergence) in the 
sense of being unexpected, unpredictable, or unexplainable on basis of the 
knowledge about the parts of the system in isolation (more on this in Section 3.3). 
 
2. Different Kinds of Complexity 
A second way to characterize the phenomenon of complexity is to distinguish 
different kinds of complexity. At least two classifications of complexity are worth 
being mentioned here. The first one has been introduced by Mitchell (2003, 2009). 
She distinguishes three different kinds of complexity in biology: constitutive 
complexity, dynamic complexity, and evolved complexity. ‘Constitutive complexity’ 
refers to the complexity of the structure that biological systems (like organisms) 
display. The structure of biological systems is complex if the system as a whole is 
being formed of numerous parts in non-random, non-simple organization (see also 
Simon 1962; Wimsatt 2007). ‘Dynamic complexity’ concerns the complexity of the 
processes that biological systems are engaged in, for instance the developmental or 
evolutionary processes that organisms undergo. Finally, ‘evolving complexity’ refers 
to the domain of alternative adaptive solutions that are available for certain adaptive 
problems. If there exists a wide diversity of forms in life which have evolved as 
solutions to the same adaptive problem there is said to be much evolving complexity. 
 More recently, Kuhlmann (2011) has argued that it is important to distinguish 
compositional complexity from dynamical complexity. Although he uses similar words 
as Mitchell, the two kinds of complexity he identifies are different from hers. This 
difference might (at least partly) be due to the fact that Kuhlmann is more interested 
in complex systems from physics and socio-economics, rather than from biology. 
What Kuhlmann means by compositional complexity of a system is the complicated 
organization of the set-up conditions of a system, that is, the fact that a system 
consists of many parts and that the individual behaviors of the parts as well as their 
organization determine the overall behavior of a system. Somehow surprisingly, 
Kuhlmann emphasizes that the parts of compositionally complex systems interact 
with each other in a linear fashion, which is why the behavior of the system is a 
summation of the behaviors of its parts. Contrary to this, in case of dynamical 
complexity most facts about the nature of the parts of the system as well as their 
initial arrangement have no bearing on the behavior of the system. Rather, what 
makes these kinds of systems complex is that, although they are compositionally 
simple and the rules that determine their dynamics are simple (but non-linear), they 
show patterns that are factually unpredictable and qualitatively unexpectable. 
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3. Further Philosophical Issues 
 
3.1. Explaining Complexity 
One important philosophical question that arises in the context of complex system 
research concerns the nature of scientific explanation. Do the explanations of the 
behavior of complex systems constitute a special kind of explanations, as for 
instance Mitchell (2009) and Kuhlmann (2011) argue? Or do they belong to one or 
more of the established kinds of explanation (like causal-mechanistic explanation, 
covering-law explanation, functional explanation, mathematical explanation, etc.)?
 A good starting point for addressing this question is the widespread claim of 
biologists that reductionistic-mechanistic research strategies (reduction; mechanism) 
are inappropriate or, at least, insufficient to investigate and explain the behavior of 
complex systems (e.g. Gallagher and Appenzeller 1999). This suggests that 
explanations that are developed in sciences of complex systems are non-reductive 
(explanation, reductive) and non-mechanistic. However, it is far from clear what 
exactly this claim amounts to and whether it is true for all explanations in this field 
(e.g., whether it also applies to computational explanations that can be found for 
instance in systems biology). One reason why the explanation of the behavior of 
complex systems might be non-reductive is that these explanations frequently 
appeal not only to the parts of the system, but also to contextual factors and higher-
level factors (which is why they are said to be multi-level explanations; Mitchell 
2009). Moreover, the behavior of complex systems cannot be explained by referring 
only to the parts of the system in isolation (which is, in turn, typical for reductive 
explanations; Kaiser 2011). However, in the last 15 years several accounts of 
mechanistic explanation have been developed which decouple the concept of a 
mechanistic explanation from the concept of a reductive explanation because they 
allow higher-level and contextual factors to figure center stage in a mechanistic 
explanation (e.g. Bechtel 2008). 
 
3.2. Causality and Complex Systems 
A second philosophical question concerns the causal structure of complex systems 
(causality). Do any challenges and constraints for a philosophical theory of causation 
arise from the peculiarities of the causal structure of complex systems?  
A possible challenge might be the existence of downward causation, which is 
a topic that is also frequently discussed in science itself. Downward causation 
encompasses cases, in which entities from a higher level of organization causally 
affects entities from a lower level (interlevel causation). Downward causation 
between a whole (i.e. the higher-level entity) and its parts (i.e. the lower-level 
entities) is regarded as particularly problematic because a central assumption in 
most theories of causation is that cause and effect must not be identical. However, if 
it is true that the relation between a whole and the set of its organized parts is one of 
identity, as one could argue, the whole cannot be causally related to its parts. 
- 6 - 
 
Other challenges and constraints of a theory of causation that may arise from 
the investigation of complex systems concern the context-sensitivity of their behavior 
and the non-linearity of the interactions between their parts. The latter often involve 
cyclic causal relations like feedback which constitute a challenge for some theories 
of causation (e.g., for causal graph theories). 
 
3.3 Emergence and the Limits of Reductionism 
One of the features that are characteristic of complex systems is that their behavior 
is said to be emergent (see Section 1). However, despite its ubiquity the notion of 
emergence is left notoriously vague. Most scientists use the term ‘emergence’ in an 
epistemic sense, that is, they call a behavior (or property) of a system emergent if it 
is unpredictable, unexpectable, or unexplainable on basis of knowledge about the 
behavior (or properties) of its parts in isolation.  
Studying emergent behaviors of complex systems reveals the limits of 
reductionism (reduction). More precisely, it discloses the conditions under which the 
(exclusive) application of reductive research strategies (like decomposition, 
simplification of the system’s context, and investigating parts in isolation; Wimsatt 
2007; Kaiser 2011) is not adequate any more. In other words, the emergent behavior 
of a complex system cannot be understood by decomposing it into its parts, by 
examining the parts in isolation (i.e. separated from the original system), and by 
ignoring the context of the system. This is, for instance, due to the fact that the parts 
of a complex system are organized or “integrated” (Bechtel/Richardson 2010) in 
such a complicated way that their behavior is co-determined by the system’s 
organization. Furthermore, the behavior of several complex systems heavily 
depends on certain parts of their context (i.e. it is non-robust under variations of 
these contextual factors), which is why the context of the system cannot be ignored 
altogether or simplified. 
 
Cross-references 
amplification; causality; classification; emergence; explanation; explanation, 
reductive; feedback; gene regulatory networks; hierarchy; holism; interlevel 
causation; mechanism; organization; reduction; robustness; self-organization 
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